Utopian World Has Problems

The confusion one might experience in approaching such a question is mirrored in the centuries of scholastic debate the text has aroused; since its very first appearance in print Utopia has succeeded in functioning primarily to provoke uncertainty and disagreement amongst its readers and interpreters. The problem, of course, is that it is extremely difficult, even on close analysis of the text, to discern the degree to which the vision of the supposedly ‘perfect’ society Utopia paints is intended to be taken seriously. While on the one hand the book overtly works to present us with a technically flawless plan for the organisation of society, on the other, it seems simultaneously to strive to make us aware of certain dubious features of that plan, which cannot help but limit reader enthusiasm in the approach to the whole.
Such instances of textual ambiguity are easily found, and extremely well documented. Firstly, of course, we must acknowledge the double-nature of the book’s place and people names: most obviously, ‘Utopia’ itself literally means ‘no-place’ in Greek; and ‘Hytholoday’ (the name of the fictional traveller who narrates to More his experiences of Utopia) can be taken to signify “‘peddler of nonsense’, [or] ‘expert in trifles’”. There are many such instances of name-play throughout the text, leading to the creation of a picture which, although held up in all seriousness by its describer, is constantly (though mildly) belittled by the purposefully playful nature of the language that names its features. However, the more substantial barrier to our acceptance of Utopia’s social formulations comes in the subtle hints at imperfections carried deeper within the body of the otherwise positive text. We gradually learn of the intensely prescriptive nature of the Utopian society; it seems that, in its dedication to achieving the absolute public good, the freedom of its inhabitants is undeniably compromised in several principle ways. It is the ultimate extremeness of these restrictions on individual freedom – made increasingly apparent to us throughout the progress of the text which must lead to our questioning of the overall desirability of the society being described.
It is a theoretically perfect equation. Simple and sensible forms of social control lead to social stability, and to the creation of model social subjects; and in the process, corruption, and all its corresponding disruptive vices, are usefully driven out from society. However, despite its technical soundness, we cannot find ourselves accepting this formulation with ease. The tone of strictness in the paragraph betrays the severity of the regime it describes. The paragraph comes about as a conclusion to a previous section describing the limits to travelling placed on the citizens of Utopia; Hytholoday spends some time explaining the nature of this particular set of rules, the reasons for them, and the repercussions of any disobedience to them.
Thus, we see stability of the social process is gained, as no one individual is ever allowed to spontaneously revolt from the system; there is literally nowhere a citizen can go, nowhere to hide. The communality of living ensures that citizens cannot secretly deflect. The severity of the punishment to any deflectors is telling: ‘bondage’ involves being admitted to slavery, to living in the admittedly “miserable and wretched condition of bondmen”. This punishment, as is here evidenced, is not limited only to the committers of unimaginably heinous crimes. It is shown to be the common solution to any problem threatening to affect social stability – and is further hinted to be an often-used solution, judging by the substantial place that bondmen, or slaves, seem to occupy in the workings of the Utopian society.
We might here briefly look at one other example of a crime which is threatened with bondage, in order to further grasp the reasons for the severity of such punishment: adultery. There are “no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings”; further, any non-work time must be spent in a “respectable” way. Debauchery indeed, even the threat of or potential for debauchery is criminal.
We thus begin to understand more fully the reason behind the severity and frequency of the punishment of universal or seemingly inoffensive crimes. Any impulse or activity perceived as ‘anarchic’ or ‘destabilising’. That is, any impulse or activity which does not conform to and have its place within the workings of society must, for the good of that society, be absolutely and categorically disallowed. Sexual deviance like all other profoundly human and irrational instincts is potentially disruptive to the social mechanism; the social mechanism, therefore, must do all in its power to prevent against the existence of any such destabilising forces. Hence the reason for the strictness of punishment for any deviance whatsoever from the social rule: laws must be obeyed to the utmost in order that no cracks are allowed to appear in the system or its inhabitants.
What this article has succeeded in doing is uncovering a few of those pivotal problems lurking undeniably behind the perfect veneer of the society More has described; and these problems have proved themselves significant. Ultimately, as the title quote illustrates, More’s society can be seen to harbour the potentially dangerous impulse to extreme social control. Whether or not this extreme conclusion is justified, we must acknowledge that the elements which lead to its formulation are undeniably present in Utopia. And it is this the self--evident potential for inhumanity that will always exist in the society which strives to attain perfection, and which More worked into his own vision of ‘Utopia’.